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The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would first like to determine whether there are any other points of order to be made before entertaining a preferential motion.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against section 105 on page 6 of the bill on the ground that it is legislation in an appropriation bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. PASSMAN] desire to be heard on the point of order? The gentleman from Oregon has made a point of order to the language in the bill on page 6, beginning on line 12 through line 3 on page 7, or all of section 105. The gentleman from Oregon makes a point of order on the ground that this particular section constitutes legislation on an appropriation bill.

The Chair will be glad to hear the gentleman from Louisiana on the point of order.

Mr. PASSMAN. I am of opinion that the gentleman from Louisiana would have to concede that it is legislation on an appropriation bill.

Mr. FULTON. I do not concede the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will be glad to hear the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FULTON. This is not legislation on an appropriation bill because it is an expression of the sense of Congress:

The Congress hereby reiterates its opposition to the seating in the United Nations of the Communist China regime as the representative of China.

It is an expression of the sense of Congress and is not legislation as far as an appropriation bill is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. MILLS). The gentleman from Oregon makes a point of order against section 105. The gentleman from Louisiana concedes the point of order. The gentleman from Pennsylvania suggests that this language is not legislation on an appropriation bill and points out that it represents an expression of the sense of Congress. For that very reason, if for no other, the language would be legislation on an appropriation bill.

The Chair must sustain the point of order made by the gentleman from Oregon.

Are there points of order to any other language in the bill.

Does the gentleman from Illinois offer a preferential motion?

Mr. MASON. I do.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. MASON moves that the Committee do now rise and report the bill back to the House with the recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken from the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.

Mr. MASON. Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to take the 5 minutes at this time of day. In the first place, Mr. Chairman, I think it is an imposition upon those of us who get here early in

the morning to do the work and then are kept all hours of the day when there is practically nothing of importance for the rest of the week.

In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, we are considering this mutual security bill which provides for aid to foreign countries in the shape of some of its going to build hard roads in foreign countries, taking money out of the General Treasury of the United States. Our committee has been struggling for 2 days to find some money to build hard roads in this country, but we are told that the administration and all those in authority object to taking any money out of our General Treasury for our own roads.

For that reason I am offering this motion to strike out the enacting clause.

Mr. PASSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the preferential motion. I am afraid that should the enacting clause be stricken we might not be able to get a foreign aid bill this session.

I take just 1 minute, Mr. Chairman, to say that if at times I have appeared to be unkind in the matter of Members wanting additional time, I want them to know I have not purposely attempted to cut off debate. Sitting here charged with the responsibility of managing the bill and listening to the amendments and the many arguments and points of order that arise, one is very much in suspense and tense. So it has not been my purpose to cut off anybody's time, and in the one instance where I did it was certainly not done in order to keep the Member from speaking.

I yield now to the distinguished gentleman from Vermont if he has something further to say.

Mr. MEYER. I thank the gentleman for his courtesy but it is now too late.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the preferential motion offered by the gentleman from Illinois.

The motion was rejected.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HARDY: On page 8, after line 17, insert the following: "Sec. 114. None of the funds herein appropriated shall be used to carry out any provision of chapter II, III, or IV of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, during any period when more than twenty days have elapsed between the request for, and the furnishing of, any document, paper, communication, audit, review, finding, recommendation, report, or other material relating to the administration of such provision by the International Cooperation Administration, to the General Accounting Office or any committee of the Congress, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, charged with considering legislation or appropriation for or expenditures of the International Cooperation Administration and the Department of State."

Mr. GARY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARDY. I yield to my colleague from Virginia.

Mr. GARY. As I understand it, this is merely an attempt to assist the Comptroller General and the Congress in getting proper documents and papers from the ICA?

Mr. HARDY. That is exactly the purpose of it.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order. I was on my feet seeking recognition to make a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. Had the gentleman raised his voice?

Mr. FORD. I certainly did.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan says he was on his feet trying to obtain recognition to make a point of order against the amendment.

There has been confusion at times and it is possible that the Chair did not hear the gentleman. The Chair feels under the circumstances, the gentleman being on his feet seeking recognition trying to make a point of order, that the Chair will hear the gentleman. Ordinarily, the point of order would come too late, debate having occurred on the amendment, but because the gentleman was seeking the attention of the Chair, the Chair feels that he must recognize the gentleman to make the point of order.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, on reading the proposed amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia, it is my belief this amendment does impose on the executive branch of the Government additional burdens that are not required by any existing legislation. For that reason it is legislation on an appropriation bill.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard on the point of order?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will be glad to hear the gentleman.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, the language of this amendment does not impose any burden on the executive branch of the Government that is not already contained in existing legislation. The amendment is merely a limitation and it presupposes there may be action under existing law but does not require action by anybody. The language in this amendment is taken directly from the language in the Mutual Security Act, which authorized these appropriations.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard on the point of order?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will be glad to hear the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out further in support of the gentleman's argument, he says this language is in the Mutual Security Act. It is part of existing law and the gentleman's amendment is merely a limitation on expenditures until existing law is complied with.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman from Ohio advise the Chair just where this language appears in the Mutual Security Act?

Mr. HAYS. I cannot cite the exact section.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. MILLS). The Chair is prepared to rule.

The gentleman from Virginia offers an amendment to the bill on page 8 after line 17, to which the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Ford] makes a point of order on the ground that the language is legislation on an appropriation bill.

The Chair has had an opportunity to examine the amendment made in the

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act of 1959 to the Mutual Security Act amending section 534 of that act.

The Chair is of the opinion that there is legislative authorization for the furnishing of these documents and for that which is required within this amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia.

The Chair, therefore, overrules the point of order.

Mr. PASSMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARDY. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. PASSMAN. Is this not the amendment that you discussed with the chairman of the committee, the former chairman of the committee, and many other Members of the House? They all felt it would serve a good purpose and there was no objection to it. On that basis I agreed not to object to the amendment if it was not subject to a point of order. I think it is good legislation. Many members of the committee have had an opportunity to discuss it, and I did not know there would be objection to it. I hope the amendment will be adopted.

Mr. HARDY. I am grateful to the gentleman.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARDY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FLOOD. Was it not the intention of the gentleman from Virginia at all times merely to implement existing legislation? There was no attempt to legislate upon it.

Mr. HARDY. Not at all. It was purely for the purpose of implementing the legislation.

Mr. Chairman, several times during the debate this afternoon we have heard of the refusal of officials in the Department of State and the International Cooperation Administration to provide committees of the Congress, including the Appropriations Committee handling the bill here this afternoon, with the information they need to make intelligent judgments on foreign aid programs and the public funds to support them.

Mr. Chairman, my responsibility, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Monetary Affairs of the House Committee on Government Operations, has been to examine, in a post-audit way, the efficiency and economy of the expenditures under foreign aid authorizations and appropriations. We have experienced the same recalcitrance on the part of ICA officials as has been complained of by others.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment is designed to facilitate the studies and inquiries not only of committees of the Congress concerned with this program, but also of the General Accounting Office. This is the agency of the Congress charged with the responsibility of auditing Government expenditures generally and reporting to us.

Mr. Chairman, during the consideration of the mutual security authorization bill for 1959, I offered an amendment designed to break down this barrier to access by the Congress to full information about foreign aid operations. The

amendment was adopted, unanimously I believe, in both the House and the Senate versions of the mutual security bill and thus was not in dispute in the conference. The language of the amendment reads as follows:

All documents, papers, communications, audits, reviews, findings, recommendations, reports, and other material which relate to the operation or activities of the International Cooperation Administration shall be furnished to the General Accounting Office and to any committee of the Congress, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, charged with considering legislation or appropriation for, or expenditures of, such Administration, upon request of the General Accounting Office or such committee or subcommittee as the case may be.

Mr. Chairman, I must confess that I was somewhat dismayed when the President, upon signing the mutual security bill, prompted by advisers I know not whom, issued a three-paragraph statement aimed at nullifying the amendment solemnly adopted by the Congress. Let me read you what the White House statement says:

I have today signed H.R. 7500, a bill amending the Mutual Security Act of 1954. Three amendments made by the bill concern disclosure by the executive branch of information, documents and materials relating to the mutual security program or certain of its aspects.

I have signed this bill on the expressed premise that the three amendments relating to disclosure are not intended to alter and cannot alter the recognized constitutional duty and power of the Executive with respect to the disclosure of information, documents, and other material. Indeed, any other construction of these amendments would raise grave constitutional questions under the historic separation-of-powers doctrine.

In this connection, I am constrained to emphasize once again that it is the established policy of the executive branch to provide the Congress and the public with the fullest possible information consistent with the public interest. This policy will continue to guide the executive branch in carrying out the mutual security program so that there may be a full understanding of the program and its vital importance to the national security.

Mr. Chairman, if the White House had not issued this statement, I would not have considered it necessary to offer the amendment now pending before the committee. I had thought that the clear and unequivocal expression of Congress would be observed by the agencies charged with the carrying out of foreign aid policies prescribed by the Congress. However, in the light of the White House statement, the Congress has no alternative but to call upon its power of the purse in order to compel respect for its constitutional prerogatives.

The Congress cannot function effectively as elected representatives of the people in determining national policy if it is to be denied access to full, complete, and accurate information about the conduct of the public business. If executive officials are permitted to assert a proprietary interest in public funds, to dispense them as they see fit, free from congressional scrutiny, we have passed from the system of government through elected representatives into a bureaucratic determination of the course of our

national development and progress. Mr. Chairman, I believe my amendment will provide an effective curb on bureaucratic arrogance. I believe it will enable the Congress to obtain the information which is so necessary to intelligent discussion and decision on the course of national policy.

Mr. MEADER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HARDY].

It has been my privilege to serve with the gentleman from Virginia on the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Monetary Affairs of the House Committee on Government Operations in the 84th, 85th, and 86th Congresses. It has been a pleasure to serve on the subcommittee because it has been conducted efficiently and in a nonpartisan manner. All of our actions and reports have been unanimous.

As the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HARDY] pointed out, we have been confronted, in the discharge of our responsibility to investigate the economy and efficiency of foreign aid expenditures, by a lack of cooperation on the part of the officials administering the foreign aid program in providing the subcommittee with full and accurate information with respect to their official activities. Sometimes this obstruction has taken the form of procrastination, evasion, and doubletalk, but occasionally there have been instances of outright defiance of requests and a refusal to produce documents, not on the basis that they were classified information, but on the basis that they were internal administrative matters, and, under the alleged doctrine of "executive privilege" to withhold information from Congress, they have been denied to our subcommittee.

Mr. Chairman, my position on the issue of the right of Congress to full and complete information about the conduct of the public business is well known. I have engaged in an exchange of correspondence with the Attorney General of the United States with respect to his assertion of the doctrine of "executive privilege" and have sought on every occasion to uphold and advance the power of Congress to obtain the facts it needs to legislate wisely.

Mr. Chairman, at a session of our subcommittee, May 4, 1959, dealing primarily with the refusal of the International Cooperation Administration to submit to the subcommittee certain information the subcommittee had requested, this subject was discussed with representations of the Administration, including Mr. Leonard J. Saccio, then Acting Director of the International Cooperation Administration, and Mr. Loftus Becker, legal adviser to the Department of State. I incorporate that passage from the subcommittee's record at this point in my remarks:

Mr. MEADER. Mr. Becker, I know this matter can be discussed for a long time, but you assert that the withholding of these documents requested by the committee is based upon, I think you used the word, the principle of Executive privilege.

Mr. BECKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MEADER. Would you mind citing what authority you have for the existence of any such principle?

Mr. BECKER. Yes. I think there is a rather full description of it in the statement by the Honorable William P. Rogers, Attorney General of the United States, on the inquiry by the legislative branch concerning the decision-making process in documents of the executive branch, which was delivered before a Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 6, 1958.

Mr. MEADER. Have you examined that statement of the Attorney General?

Mr. BECKER. Yes, I have.

Mr. MEADER. And you concur in it, do you?

Mr. BECKER. I do.

Mr. MEADER. Do you have any other authority than that expressed in the Attorney General's statement?

Mr. BECKER. I can't cite offhand all of the authority, but I have read a very substantial number of authorities, many of which are cited in the Attorney General's statement.

Mr. MEADER. In the Attorney General's statement a kind of parenthetical reference is made to *McGrain v. Daugherty*. I wonder if you are familiar with the long history of cases cited by the Supreme Court in which congressional investigatory power as upheld?

Mr. BECKER. Yes. I know there were a number of such cases.

Mr. MEADER. Do you have any doubt about the validity of those holdings?

Mr. BECKER. No.

Mr. MEADER. In other words, you do concede that the Congress does have the power of inquiry as an inherent part of its legislative power?

Mr. BECKER. Oh, yes, indeed, sir.

Mr. MEADER. Yet you relied on the Attorney General's reasoning which seems to have some nebulous relationship to the separation of powers doctrine, as overturning a long history of decided Supreme Court cases upholding the power of inquiry of Congress?

Mr. BECKER. Not at all, sir. In my view the Attorney General's statement is in complete conformity with all of the decisions of the Supreme Court. What he merely states is that there are limits upon the investigatory power of the Congress.

Mr. MEADER. And those limits are to be determined by the executive branch of the Government?

Mr. BECKER. Of necessity.

Mr. MEADER. Do you have any view—it did not seem to me to be very clearly expressed in the Attorney General's statement to the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee—on just who in the executive branch of the Government possesses this rather sweeping power to deny the effectiveness of a congressional subpoena?

Mr. BECKER. Ultimately, the President, sir. Mr. MEADER. You say ultimately the President. But it seems to me that the Secretary of State in this instance has exercised the power of this so-called Executive privilege to deny and thwart a congressional subpoena.

Mr. BECKER. The Secretary acts, of course, under the direction of the President.

Mr. MEADER. How far down the line does that go, Mr. Becker? Do you have any opinion about that?

Mr. BECKER. Well, I think everybody who is appointed by the President certainly acts under his direction.

Mr. MEADER. So that any officer appointed by the President where confirmation by the Senate is required would possess the power to deny a request of a congressional committee?

Mr. BECKER. I have not considered that question, Mr. MEADER, but I am confident that the Secretary of States does.

Mr. MEADER. I don't know that it would be very valuable to pursue this.

I might refer, Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me, to an exchange of correspondence I had with the Attorney General on this subject, which appears in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of March 10, 1958, the beginning of it, on page 3280, and continues on March 31, 1958, on page 5239. This is an exchange of correspondence between myself and the Attorney General of the United States.

I would like also for our record to contain a reference to the insertion in the RECORD on July 14, 1958, on page 12521, where I put in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a very scholarly article by Mr. Gerald Morgan, who at that time was the legal adviser to President Eisenhower. It was a Law Review article in the California Law Review of December 1949, entitled "Congressional Investigations—Judicial Review. *Kilburn v. Thompson* Revisited."

I would only like to state, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that I am very much disturbed that there seems to be an increasing inclination on the part of the executive branch of the Government to assert this so-called doctrine of Executive privilege to thwart congressional investigation.

I think there is no foundation whatever in the law for any such doctrine. I think it is imagined out of the air. There are no court cases upholding any such doctrine, and there is a long line of cases which indicates Congress has the power to get the facts it needs; and by and large, as the public is concerned with the public business, those facts are in the possession of the executive branch of the Government, and if any clerk in the executive branch of the Government can tell Congress they do not need to know about the public business and they will decide whether it is proper for the Congress to have it, it bears implications upon the very nature of our Government of self-government through elected representatives, because obviously if you don't know you can't make intelligent decisions—legislative policy decisions.

I am disturbed that there is a growing tendency on the part of the executive branch of the Government to exert this non-existent, fanciful doctrine of Executive privilege any time they do not want to give Congress some information Congress thinks it ought to have.

Mr. HARDY. I think it is a very disturbing thing generally and it is something that could lead to all kinds of difficulties. It is something I don't think we can live with. In the instant case, actually significant parts of this inquiry have been thwarted by so-called Executive privilege. The Congress is left in the dark with implications in the testimony which reflect seriously on people who are still holding public jobs and being paid out of tax funds. There are serious implications with respect to the performance of some of the people who may have been the objects of criticism by the ones who were discharged. The charges which were made in a great many cases have been documented and adequately supported in the record of this hearing. I think that the implications are extremely serious and they are going to have to be called to the attention of the House.

Mr. Chairman, when the House accepted the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia to the Mutual Security Act of 1959, ordering that documents in possession of the International Cooperation Administration be made available to the General Accounting Office and to appropriate committees of the Congress, we had thought that this battle to uphold the right of Congress to full knowledge of the conduct of the public business had been won. However,

as the gentleman from Virginia has pointed out, the President, in signing that act containing the Hardy amendments, which I believe were unanimously approved in both the House and the Senate, issued a formal press release asserting that the amendments were inoperative because of the so-called constitutional Executive privilege to withhold information.

There has been no Court decision on this most important constitutional question. Either the Congress or the Executive has exercised restraint or acquiescence so that the investigative power of the Congress with respect to asserted claims of privilege in the Executive to withhold documents from the Congress has never been passed upon in litigation.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that such a clash in the courts between the two great branches of our Government is unseemly and should be avoided if possible.

I believe the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia has provided an avenue for the enforcement of the power of the Congress to obtain information about the conduct of public affairs which minimizes the risk of such unseemly litigation.

As I envision it, if the International Cooperation Administration officials, after the bill presently before us becomes law, should arbitrarily and contumaciously disregard a valid request of any of the committees named in the Hardy amendment, the Comptroller General would be bound, under the Hardy amendment, to rule that expenditures to carry out provisions of the Mutual Security Act, with respect to which the request for information was refused, would be illegal.

Mr. Chairman, in support of the laudable purpose of the Hardy amendment, I was very interested to read in this morning's Washington Post an excellent editorial which I incorporate at this point in my remarks:

EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE

President Eisenhower was badly advised in his statement putting his own construction on the meaning of the Hardy amendment to the Mutual Security Act. Congress is as well aware as the President that legislation cannot alter the constitutional duties of the Executive with respect to the disclosure of information, documents and other materials, and it is hardly in need of a lecture on the subject. It also is aware, however, that the Executive cannot alter the constitutional duties of Congress.

"The information amendment states that upon request: All documents, papers, communications, audits, reviews, findings, recommendations, reports, and other material which relate to the operation or activities of the International Cooperation Administration shall be furnished to the General Accounting Office and to any committee of the Congress, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof."

The language is similar to that in the act creating the General Accounting Office. It seems to be an appropriate exercise of the right of the legislative branch to make sure that the purposes of the legislature are carried out and that the money is wisely and honestly disbursed. Some of the information so far made available to Congress certainly justifies anxiety with reference to the handling of these moneys. Those entirely sympathetic with the objectives of the

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program have been rightly distressed at evidences of laxity and maladministration.

These are not matters about which Congress can be wholly indifferent, trusting blindly and implicitly in the good faith and performance of executive departments. If there is a nonreviewable, nonjusticiable power in the executive to refuse all information it wishes to withhold, Congress might as well shut up shop.

Just where the line can be drawn has always been a matter of some political pulling and hauling. The courts never have ruled on the matter. Whatever the precise meaning of the Constitution, and whatever the exact rights of the executive, the early Presidents, while often arguing the existence of an executive privilege, generally gave Congress what it sought. Although President Washington was unhappy at the way in which the House sought papers on the tragic St. Clair expedition, he sent up all the matter at hand as Douglas Freeman notes:

"Washington had learned long previously the protective value of candor in dealing with the American people and he knew that one reason for their trust in him was their belief he would tell them the whole truth." The wisest Presidents have imitated such candor, particularly in dealing with situations in which irregularities were feared.

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the gentleman from Virginia for his persistence and for his skill in fashioning a sanction which, so far as I can see, is without flaw and which will effectively compel the production of information at the request of the Congress which is so necessary to sound and intelligent declarations of public policy in our modern complex society.

I urge the adoption of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HARDY].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. CONTE: On page 8, line 4, strike out section 112, lines 4, 5, and 6.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, as the authorization bill passed the House and the Senate and was signed by the President, an item of \$10 million was placed in the authorization bill for the U.S. participation in the World Refugee Year. This clause was stricken by the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the United Nations last December passed a resolution calling for a speedup of the refugee program throughout the world. The United States was to participate in this program for European refugees from Red China, for the Algerian refugees in Tunis and Morocco, and other countries, and resettlement grants in the country of immigration.

Mr. Chairman, there are literally thousands of homeless souls behind the Iron Curtain all over the world and, Mr. Chairman, this is merely a contribution by the United States, with 30 other countries throughout the world, to speed up the program so as to bring the mothers together with their children once more, to bring the husbands and wives together, as well as fathers and sons. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this amendment will pass. It will cost no more money. The money will come out

of the contingency fund. I am not asking for a single extra dollar. I hope the United States will live up to its bargain and responsibility.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. JUDD. The point ought to be made also that it is not mandatory for the Executive to use this \$10 million for World Refugee Year. The language provides that it shall be available for this purpose if a suitable program is developed and if the various other countries also contribute their share, and if the President decides that is the best use to make of not to exceed \$10 million of the funds in the Contingency Fund.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FULTON. I would like to point out that President Eisenhower has called on the country and the citizens to participate in the World Refugee Year, and this will help implement that. I strongly support the amendment.

Mr. CONTE. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, just about every church group in the United States has endorsed this Refugee Year program.

Mr. DORN of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. DORN of South Carolina. Where are these refugees going?

Mr. CONTE. Some will be returned to their homelands, others will be placed in countries with their families, so that they can once again live with dignity and have opportunity to prosper.

Mr. DORN of South Carolina. I just wanted to make sure they did not come here.

Mr. PASSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

I certainly oppose the amendment. I thought that the committee was almost unanimous on this limitation that we placed in the bill. This is earmarking funds, of course, from the contingency fund. The House has just voted down a similar proposal. Now, there are so many of these provisions in the bill that provide for additional money, and the subcommittee and the full committee felt that this proviso should be placed in there. Therefore, I hope that the committee votes down the amendment.

Mr. GARY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PASSMAN. I yield.

Mr. GARY. Mr. Chairman, we have had refugee programs in this bill for many years. They have been very valuable programs, and proper programs. They have accomplished a great deal in handling the refugees abroad. We still have provisions for refugee programs in this bill.

The item now under debate is a special appropriation of \$10 million, with the idea of stepping up the program during the Refugee Year. What it will result in we can never know. It will be a long time before we complete the refugee program. All that this would amount to is

to step up our regular program and put it on a permanent basis of \$10 million a year.

Mr. PASSMAN. I might also state that there is no budget estimate submitted for this item. It is a blanket request, with no budget request. I trust the amendment will be voted down.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, because of the resolution adopted by the United Nations designating this year as Refugee Year, I trust that the \$10 million provided for will be appropriated. But let us get a true perspective of the situation. I had a nose count made of the refugees who are subject to the mandate of the United Nations. There are fewer than 29,000 in Europe. This, of course, strikes many of the Members as very strange because of the bills that have been introduced providing for the admission into the United States of 68,000 annually. But there are not that many refugees in all of Europe who are subject to the mandate of the United Nations.

Therefore, if we appropriate \$10 million—and I am not objecting to it—let it be understood that this money will be used for the refugees in Palestine and for the upward of 3 million Chinese refugees in Hong Kong.

In that connection, it is very interesting to note that the British offered the resolution designating this year as Refugee Year. They were a long while in finding out that there were such things as refugees. They were a long time in finding out that the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration was moving thousands of people every year. It was not until the problem in Hong Kong became acute that the British came along with this resolution and an appropriation of \$500,000.

I am very proud of the fact that our great Republic has contributed much more than \$500,000 every year in the relief of this problem. But let us go into this thing with our eyes wide open. This money cannot be used for European refugees because there just are not that many.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. PASSMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ALEXANDER. I yield.

Mr. PASSMAN. I would like to state again that there has been no budget estimate for this item and any support for the amendment has been generated, in my opinion, today. I do not recall any support for this amendment in the committee.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ALEXANDER. I yield.

Mr. CONTE. I lost so many battles with the gentleman in the subcommittee that I was punch drunk at that point.

Mr. PASSMAN. The gentleman means that he supported my views and subsequently decided that I was wrong. Let us resolve our differences the next time.